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I. Court System and its Reforms in China 
 
1. The current situation of judicial system 
An independent and fair judicial power is crucial to the effectiveness of the 
market economy, the rule of law, and social justice.  China's reforms are going 
through a period of structural adjustment, which must be backed up by an effective 
and fair judicial system.  In China, the judicial authority over civil ,administrative 
and criminal cases is exercised by the People's Court.  In the judicial proceedings, 
the People's Court administers justice independently according to law, subject to no 
interference by administrative organs, organizations or individuals.  Furthermore, the 
People's Court shall base itself on facts and take the law as the criterion. 
 
Chinese courts hear 5.2 million criminal, civil, economic, and administrative 
cases annually.  Chinese Courts are supposed to deal a harsh blow to serious crimes 
that threaten social stability, to readjust the relationship between civil and economic 
affairs and eliminate social contradictions, and to guarantee the smooth 
implementation of major reform measures.1  
 
As China is moving towards the “litigatious society”, the increasing litigation 
is classified into three categories, namely: civil and commercial cases, administrative 
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cases and criminal case.  The trial of civil and commercial cases is governed by the 
Civil Procedure Law of 1991 and relevant substantive private law, the trial of 
administrative cases is governed by the Administrative Procedure Law of 1989 and 
relevant substantive administrative law, and the trial of criminal cases is governed by 
the Criminal Procedure Law of 1996 and relevant substantive criminal law.  Among 
other things, civil and commercial cases are the most predominant categories in terms 
of workload, including but not confined to contracts, torts, financial disputes, 
intellectual properties, State-owned enterprise reforms, farmland contracting, 
agricultural development, real estate, labour disputes, etc. 
 
China began to pay more attention to judicial justice issues in the autumn of 
1997.  But the current judicial system is lagging behind in the implementation of 
these laws and regulations, and some malpractice still occurs in the courts.  The 
judicial shortcomings include the judicial corruption, ineffectiveness of the judiciary, 
and lack of independence of the judiciary.  Judges' expertise should be further 
improved.  Some of the judges abuse their power, severely damaging justice of 
judicature, and tarnishing the reputation of the courts.  It is necessary to improve the 
examination and qualification system for judges so as to raise their competence.  
Rampant regional protectionism is one of the judicial shortcomings.  The fact that 
local courts do not operate on an independent basis is the major cause of this regional 
protectionism.  In terms of personnel, funds and equipment, these courts are 
administrated by local governments.  Under the current Organic Law of the People's 
Court, judges are selected by local People's Congresses.  Some local governments, in 
an attempt to protect local interests, seek countermeasures against national law.  This 
has resulted in unjust practices in some areas.2  It threatens to tarnish the dignity of 
Chinese law and the image of courts.  Worse, it may shake Chinese people's faith in 
the rule of law.  This problem needs a timely reform to ensure independence of 
judicial activities, and promote market economy. 
 
To safeguard the independence, effectiveness, accountability, honesty and 
cleanness of the judiciary, China has started reforming its judicial system.  Judicial 
reforms are also an important part of the legal and political reforms in China.  
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Without such reforms, the market economy will be in danger of foundering.  Of 
course, economic analysis can be used to help analyse judicial systems so as to 
advance the current judicial reform. 
 
 
2. Strategies against judicial corruption 
In recent years, some judicial officials abused their power for the sake of 
money or gave unfair judgment for personal revenge or interests, including taking 
bribes, corruption, embezzlement of public funds, and dealing with cases in a manner 
contrary to the law.3  In Heilongjiang Province, for instance, judges have been 
punished for such malpractice.  Between 1993 and 1996, sentences given in 438 
court cases were found to be erroneous and 460 judicial officials were penalised as a 
result.4 Their misdeeds have invited public complaints and tarnished the image of 
China's judiciary system.  A strong public opinion is growing to fight against the 
abuse of power and corruption in the judicial sector, and develop a sounder system to 
weed out the roots of corruption in law enforcement departments.  
 
To enforce internal supervisory mechanisms in courts and ensure justice, to 
give innocent people the power to redress injustice, and to discipline the judges, the 
Supreme People's Court issued in 1998 a new punishment regulation regarding 
malpractice in trial procedures to safeguard judiciary justice, according to which 
judges shall be put under investigation after they are found to have intentionally 
broken the law in court trials or carried out court verdicts and unintentional legal 
offences resulting in serious consequences.  The new regulation is applicable in both 
substantial and procedural laws, intentional or unintentional violations of the law, and 
both ongoing and past illegal activities. 
 
The Supreme People's Court of China set up a reporting centre in May 1998 to 
handle calls and mail regarding judges in the supreme court, provincial higher 
people's courts and intermediate people's courts.  Major cases to be handled by the 
centre will include embezzlement, taking bribes, abusing power, concealing or forging 
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evidence, leaking secrets, unlawful coercion, dereliction of duty and illegal collection 
of money.5 
 
Recently, there also have been cases in which the court retirees immediately 
got themselves re-employed as counsels.  They used relations forged during years of 
working in the field to influence the judicial procedure and outcome.  The Supreme 
Court prohibits retired judges from acting as defence lawyers or legal representatives 
in the region of their former service within three years of their retirement.  
According to a rule issued by the Higher People's Court in Yunnan Province, the 
plaintiff and defendant are entitled to question the qualifications of legal 
representatives.  Violation of the regulation will bring the case to a second trial.6 
 
The top priority in the campaign against judicial corruption is to rectify the 
judicial discipline and working style, and re-select the leadership of the courts at 
different levels, in a bid to ensure a clean and disciplined court system.  In 1998, 
Courts across China corrected 11,563 error-laden cases that were tried before 1998 
and punished 2,512 judges.  The Supreme People's Procuratorate punished 1,215 
prosecutors, including the chief and a deputy chief of the Anti-Corruption Bureau 
under the Supreme People's Procuratorate.  The chief, Luo Ji, was removed for 
depositing money confiscated in a case into a bureau account.  The deputy chief, 
Huang Lizhi, was removed for accepting a dinner invitation from a suspect in a case.7 
China appointed 594 new chiefs and deputy chiefs of anti-corruption bureaux at 
county and prefecture levels nation-wide in the second half of 1998 as part of its effort 
to curb judicial corruption.  The appointments were made to replace former chiefs 
who had failed to pass a nation-wide examination and assessment survey, and to fill 
existing vacancies.  As part of the campaign, 1,332 new presidents and 
vice-presidents of county and prefecture-level procuratorates were installed to fill 
vacancies left by those who had been demoted.8  To investigate cases of judicial 
corruption, the Supreme People's Court appointed ten prestigious judges as 
superintendents who will be responsible for offering advice in handling major, 
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difficult or misjudged cases.  They are also authorised to investigate major issues 
concerning judicial corruption in the courts, as well as cases involving parties from 
different jurisdictions.  They are required to forward reports and suggestions based 
on their investigations to the Supreme People's Court.9 
 
Another critical issue closely connected with judicial corruption is wrongly 
handled cases arising from authoritative judicial practice.  During a revision of more 
than 4.41 million cases of various kinds in the first 10 months of 1998, 85,188 cases 
were deemed wrongly handled.  Among them, 9,395 cases were corrected.  The rest 
are being dealt with, according to the Supreme People's Court.10  It would produce 
stronger public criticisms if the occurrence of wrongly handled cases could not be 
prevented and substantially reduced.  The goal may be achieved through legitimate 
procedures, accurate verification of facts, good evidence, clearly stated judicial 
documents, and accurate and convincing applications of the law.  It is essential to 
establish a system for investigating and prosecuting anyone who is held responsible 
for unjust or misjudged cases.  
 
According to a regulation promulgated by China's Supreme People's Court, 
judges misjudging cases or breaking the law in making their judgements have begun 
to be punished from September 1998.  The ultimate aim of the regulation is to 
improve the supervision system within the people's courts and ensure that justice is 
safeguarded.  The regulation applies to all judges, including presidents of the courts, 
presiding judges and adjudicative personnel.  People's courts have the power to 
determine whether a case handled by its personnel is misjudged or not according to 
relevant regulations and laws.  Judges held responsible for misjudging cases will 
receive a disciplinary punishment.  Those who have committed a crime in the 
process will be dealt with accordingly by judicial departments.  The investigation of 
violations of trial procedure laws cover past and present infringements.  China's 
Supreme People's Procuratorate issued a similar regulation covering China's 
procuratorial organs in late July 1998.  Both rules are significant in building up a 
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system for investigating misjudged cases.11 
 
3. The far-reaching impact of open trials and live court broadcasts on 
judicial reforms 
 
According to the Chinese Constitution and laws, except for three kinds of 
cases -- those involving national secrets, privacy and minors -- all cases should be 
tried openly.  The verdicts of the above-mentioned three kinds of cases must also be 
announced publicly.  To conduct public trials means to allow ordinary people 
including media reporters to attend court trials.  This practice has proven effective in 
many countries to prevent lopsided adjudication, lax enforcement of necessary 
judicial procedures, and prejudicial judgements against the accused.  But in practice, 
it has not been fully followed by many local courts, and court proceedings were not 
publicised until a few years ago.  
 
Of course, for many years, some courts have opened their trials to only a 
certain number of visitors who hold a special pass issued by the courts.  At the same 
time, the formality required to apply for the pass is usually complicated, which keeps 
away a great number of visitors.  In cases that require the court to open session more 
than once, many courts choose not to inform the public of the schedule.  What is 
more, some local courts say they do not have courtrooms big enough to accommodate 
all visitors.  As a result, ordinary trials are usually conducted in the presence of a 
very small number of visitors.  
 
According to current Constitution and legislation, every Chinese citizen has 
the right to information, including the right to know the truth about any case.  
However, this right can only be realised if China's courts conduct trials openly before 
the watchful eye of ordinary citizens.  If China is to establish a sound democratic and 
legal system, China's courts must conduct their proceedings openly, in accordance 
with the law.12 
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1) Opening court trials to the public 
China began to reform its judicial procedures in 1996.  Conducting an open 
trial has been a major requirement of the reform.  But no regulations have been 
stipulated to punish those who go against judicial principles.  Perhaps this is the 
reason the principles are being overlooked.  Some law enforcement officers and 
judges are not sure about their ability to make the right judgement in certain cases.  
Furthermore, many courts fear that the participation of ordinary visitors, especially 
media reporters, may make trials complicated.  That is the main reason for the 
unpopularity of public trials. 
 
Xiao Yang, president of the Supreme People's Court, has pointed out that 
courts must consciously put themselves under the scrutiny of the public eye and that 
the “public trials" stipulated in the Constitution must be carried out.13 Starting from 
June 10, 1998, Chinese citizens above the age of 18 have been able to audit any public 
trials held in the Beijing No 1 Intermediate People's Court.  All that is required is to 
show an ID card.  By doing that, the court has become the first intermediate court in 
China to allow its workings to be viewed.  On the same occasion, journalists are 
allowed to report any cases tried publicly by the court, provided that their reports are 
accurate and responsible.  For this purpose, an attention-grabbing screen of 
200,000-yuan (US$24,096) was set up at the gate of the Beijing No 1 Intermediate 
People's Court, listing the cases to be tried in court, in full view of an interested public.  
More and more local courts are beginning to permit citizens aged 18 or above to 
attend most court hearings. 
 
Open trials have a far-reaching impact on propelling judicial reforms and 
ensuring the integrity and justice of the legal system.  Open trial is the most direct, 
widespread and forceful kind of supervision.  It can increase judicial openness and 
transparency, prevent darkroom operations, and ensure that justice is served.  One of 
the major reasons for the public complaints about the courts is that the trials are secret 
and not transparent.  The public have an opportunity to observe and supervise 
judicial activities.  This can curb or eliminate interfering factors such as personal 
favours, power, and money.  It is an effective way to protect judicial independence, 
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and to impose pressure on judges, urging them to improve their professional skills.  
It can also improve the legal awareness of the general public.  Therefore, most legal 
and media specialists agreed that live broadcasts of courtroom hearings have a 
positive impact on China's legal reform, moving the system towards greater 
transparency.  
 
2) Live court broadcasts  
Xiao Yang, president of the Supreme People's Court expressly and repeatedly 
declared in 1998 that as long as the media respects the facts and takes an impartial 
stand, live coverage of trials is always welcome.  More than 40 television stations 
across China have broadcast live court proceedings.  The first was Nanjing City 
Television Station in Jiangsu Province.  The station began broadcasting court live in 
April, 1994 with a weekly programme titled “Courtroom Fax”.  More than 200 trials 
have been aired on the programme.  The first nation-wide live broadcast of a court 
hearing by China Central Television (CCTV) on July 11 enjoyed an audience rating of 
4.5 percent, higher than that of CCTV's noon news programme.  The copyright 
infringement case involved ten Chinese film studios and was heard in Beijing's No.  
1 Intermediate People's Court.  A survey conducted in Nanjing reveals that many 
local residents are interested in the programme and frequently ask their friends to 
record it when they are unable to watch proceedings.14  To date, at least eleven 
higher people's courts and 58 intermediate people's courts have begun live telecasts of 
trials to increase their openness and transparency.15  Experts and lawyers are often 
invited to comment on the trials, and telephones are in place to allow viewers a 
chance to air their opinions. 
 
A newly released 500-sample survey conducted by Beijing No 1 Intermediate 
People's Court indicates that 90.7 percent of its respondents think the trials they have 
attended are “just and fair”.  Among the 172 respondents who have participated in 
courtroom actions, 92.5 percent said the judges listened attentively to the litigants.  
By the end of 1998, some 2,630 people had attended trials with valid identification 
cards.  Since December 1998, all courts in Beijing have opened their courtrooms to 
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ordinary citizens.  The survey also shows that 75 percent of respondents are satisfied 
with the performance of the judges.  People were asked to evaluate the judges' 
manners, attitude towards litigants’ ability to control the trial, and proper dressing. 
 
Being exposed to the public's eyes, it is only natural for the judges to be 
cautious about every word they say.  Since courtrooms have been opened to the 
public, the quality and efficiency of handling cases in court have improved.  Judges 
usually pronounce verdicts at a later date instead of right at the end of the court 
session.  Both the complexity of some cases and the large number of legal provisions 
have imposed difficulties on the timely pronouncement of verdicts.  The quality of 
judges, which the court will routinely improve, is another reason for the late 
verdicts.16 
 
To improve media access to courts, the Supreme People's Court (SPC) has 
opened a telephone hot line to be used by the news media this year.  The hot line is 
managed by spokesmen for the court.  It follows the opening of a hot line reporting 
on law enforcement advice and another one directed to spokesmen for the NPC.  In 
addition to convening press conferences, the spokesmen will help reporters locate 
people they want to interview, clarify some facts and inform them of cases of public 
concern.  At present, the SPC holds five to eight press conferences each year.  
Reporters may still cover court stories on their own.  Chinese courts at all levels will 
gradually establish a spokesperson system.17 
 
It should be noted that although most of the public have viewed the live 
broadcasts of court cases, some of them have not.  A number of people are worried 
that this practice will disrupt the trial process and deter witnesses from speaking the 
truth, because the latter might be afraid of retaliation or exposure to the public.  
Some people believe cases shown to the public should be typical cases, and ought to 
be used to serve an instructive function.  These cases should be tried by judges of 
high calibre.  It is stipulated in China's law that any case may be open to the public, 
except when the cases involve national security or personal privacy.  If witnesses do 
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not want to be exposed to the public, blurring their pictures on TV can be an ideal 
substitute.18  All these concerns show that there is still a long way to go before this 
vivid and direct practice can be accepted by the public. 
 
It is also an open question as to how to avoid any negative impact of 
broadcasting proceedings.  Some people argue that cases involving violent crime or a 
large number of victims and witnesses should not be broadcast, while others argue 
that class-suit cases, such as consumers suing a company, would be suitable for a TV 
audience.  Defendant and plaintiff should be informed of the live broadcast 
beforehand and should not be forced into the project.  The media should remember 
they are only playing a minor role in these live broadcasts.  Media coverage of the 
cases should not improperly influence the decision reached by the courts.  Televised 
discussions by experts should be held after rather than during the court hearing.19 
 
To fulfil the basic principle of the Chinese constitution of public trial, it is 
more crucial to improve people's legal awareness and judges' professional level rather 
than focusing on the limited space of the courtroom. 
 
4. Reforms with the lay assessor system 
The people's lay assessor system is an important part of the judicial system.  
The jury system was introduced to China at the beginning of this century, but ended 
with the fall of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911).20  China inherited the people's lay 
assessor system from the former Soviet Union.  People's lay assessors had been 
instituted in regions controlled by the Communist Party of China before the founding 
of New China in 1949.  China's first constitution in 1954 made a clear provision for 
such a practice in China's judicial system.  However, the system was short-lived, 
falling victim to the “Cultural Revolution” (1966-1976).  Although the status of the 
system was re-established in the 1978 constitution, it is only recently that it has again 
been given due attention.21  The Supreme People's Court has proposed to the 
Standing Committee of the NPC to draft laws to regulate the selection, rights and 
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duties of lay assessors. 
 
Unlike the jury system practised in Western countries, Chinese lay assessors 
share equal rights and duties with the judges in court.  Forming a collegial bench 
with judges, they play a vital role in rendering trial judgements by a majority vote of 
lay assessors.  They provide an effective channel for the people to participate 
directly in judicial activities and conduct supervision of the judicial activities.   
 
Some courts in China have hired experts in special fields to function as lay 
assessors.  The Beijing No 1 Intermediate People's Court started to hire IPR rights 
academics as lay assessors a year ago.  The courts are currently paying more 
attention to lay assessors' proficiency in their individual fields than to their knowledge 
of law.  This helps judges to determine the facts of a case.22 
 
The people's lay assessor system should be further improved.  People's lay 
assessors must have a certain educational level and have acquired some legal 
knowledge.  Some local regulations state that people's lay assessors should at least 
have graduated from high school.  Many legal professionals maintain that in cities 
like Beijing and Shanghai, lay assessors should have a college education.  Since 
most lay assessors have no systematic legal education, they feel intimidated in front of 
judges, especially if disagreements arise.  This often results in assessors just listening 
to trials without making their own judgements.  Lay assessors should be encouraged 
to make their independent judgement, and deliver their opinion in good faith. 
 
It is necessary to improve legal education to ensure that judicial power is 
vested in the right hands.  While lawyers must pass strict professional examinations, 
many judges and procurators do not have to.  In this situation, judges could easily 
reach the wrong verdict, while paying little attention to lawyers.   
 
As to other issues concerning the internal judicial structure, the powers of 
collegial benches (made up of three judges) and single judges are expected to expand, 
and the function of judicial committees will be limited to difficult major cases only.  
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The practice will transform the role of the chief judges and presidents of courts from 
ratifying court judgements to ensuring proper trial conduct by all parties to a case.23 
 
5. Reforms with the township courts 
The implementing of the rule of law in the rural areas is an important part of 
the rule of law.  There are  17,411 township courts in rural areas.  Township courts 
are a branch of the county-level courts and are independent of township governments.  
The courts have a lot to do to help China's 900 million farmers solve problems arising 
from renewal of farmland contracts and the development of the rural economy.  They 
handled 50.27 percent of all first instance cases in China's courts in the past five years 
from 1993 to 1998.   
 
However, there are still problems at different governmental and judicial levels 
in building up township courts.  Although they are not a part of the township Party 
committee of township governments, some township governments have used court 
staff as government employees.  Some court arrangements could affect the outcome 
of trials.   
 
China’s Supreme People's Court has urged the courts to stamp out such 
malpractice, to stop getting involved in government affairs that are not part of their 
legal duties, and to conduct their activities in accordance with the law.  It is 
necessary to formulate rules to rework China's to strengthen the judiciary's role, so as 
to help stop corruption in it and help further effect law and order in rural areas by 
standardising the operations of township courts, their governance, and their trial 
procedures.24 
 
6. Improving efficiency, especially speeding up litigation resolutions 
Efficiency is critical to judicial justice.  According to Article 135 of the Civil 
Procedure Law of 1991, the trial of first instance shall be concluded within six months 
dating from the acceptance of the plaintiff’s suite.  According to Article 146 of Civil 
Procedure Law of 1991, the trial of first instance using the simplified procedure shall 
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be concluded within three months dating from the acceptance of the plaintiff’s suite.  
According to Article 159 of the Civil Procedure Law of 1991, the trial of second 
instance shall be concluded within three months dating from the acceptance of the 
party’s appeal.  Thus, it takes the parties nine months to get the final court rulings.  
However, both courts of first instance and courts of second instance are entitled to 
prolong the trial for due cause.  In practice, some corporations or individuals need 
two or three years to reach the final court rulings.  It has been reported that courts of 
second instance have taken around two years to deliver the final court ruling, 
requiring the court of first instance to rehear the case.  This means that the plaintiff 
and the defendant had to follow another circle of trial including first and second 
instances.25  It is urgent to speed up trials, reduce the judicial cost and improve the 
judiciary effectiveness.  The Supreme people’s court has realised that exceeding the 
time limit for concluding trials is a violation of the procedural law, and should be 
given the same attention as the correction of wrong judgements.  During the first ten 
months of 1998, courts in China handled more than 4.3 million new cases and 
concluded more than 3.82 million.26 
 
To improve judiciary effectiveness, it is necessary not only to create awareness 
among judges of modern, effective practices, but also to equip the office facilities 
with modern technologies.  Some courts, including Beijing's Higher People's Court 
(BHPC), have launched the construction of the Court Computer Information Network.  
The project of BHPC will cost about 60 million yuan (US$7.228 million).  The 
network is going to include a supporting system especially for presidents' 
decision-making, a lawsuit information system, an office management system and a 
public information system.  It will connect Beijing's more than 30 courts from 
municipal to county levels.  Beijing sees an increase of 10,000 to 15,000 cases every 
year, and its courts have already run out of space for additional officials.  The courts 
expect this network to greatly raise their efficiency by freeing them from a 
tremendous amount of manual operations presenting a looming threat to judicial 
efficiency.  Beijing residents will expect to get quick judicial consultation through 
the network, which will also greatly improve judicial transparency by releasing 
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typical cases and trial results, and receiving related inquiries.27 
 
To offer effective and timely judicial remedy to the consumers in vulnerable 
positions, it is feasible to establish consumer small claims courts or general small 
claims courts in China.  Some local courts in Suihua region, Heilongjiang Province 
and Changde City, Hunan Province, have experimented with establishing special 
courts to handle the cases concerning consumer disputes.  The author believes that it 
is more reasonable to establish the small claims courts in China, covering not only the 
consumers’ small claims, but also other small debt claims based on either contract or 
tort. 
 
7. Measures against unsatisfactory enforcement of judgements 
In China, the biggest danger threatening the dignity of the rule of law is the 
fact that it has not been possible to enforce a considerable number of rulings in civil 
law and commercial law cases.  According to the Supreme People's Court, nearly 
one million cases with a total value of 190 billion yuan (US$22.9 billion) were 
pending throughout China by September 1998.  According to high court statistics, 
the national incidence of unexecuted cases now stands at 30 percent per year.  In 
some courts, the backlog of adjudicated but unresolved cases has risen to a stunning 
60-70 percent of the annual caseload.28  In July 1998, Beijing had 9,882 un-enforced 
court decisions.  Fifty-seven percent were civil cases, while 32.6 percent were 
commercial ones.  The cases involve judgements valued in tens of billions of yuan.  
Compared with district courts, the city's higher and medium people's courts have had 
far more un-enforced court decisions, because of more complicated procedures and 
larger amounts of money involved.  For several years, un-enforced court decisions 
have continued to damage the prestige of the law and have caused widespread 
criticism.29 
 
The problem with the enforcement of court decisions did not appear until the 
late 1980s, when cases awaiting resolution peaked in many courts across China.  The 
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situation was so bad that specific enforcement divisions had to be established in 
courts at all levels to cope with the problem.  The debtors often try every means to 
conceal their real financial situations and put off repayment as long as possible.  
Some scofflaws have even used violence against law enforcers.  Since August 1998, 
more than 30 incidents have been reported in Fujian Province in which about 30 law 
enforcers were injured during their attempts to resolve cases.  Violence against law 
enforcement officers has become an increasingly serious problem.  Four court police 
officers have been killed during the process of execution in the past three years.30 
 
Local protectionism is an important factor in the context of the increasing 
number of un-enforced cases.  It is not uncommon for local governments and local 
people's congresses to intervene in execution.  They either exert their influence from 
behind the scenes or stand by the culpable litigants in public.  Jilin provincial 
government has reportedly announced a list of 94 major enterprises in its province 
slated for “special protection”, saying they are free from any liability in court-ordered 
debt collecting actions.  There are probably more protected enterprises at the 
prefecture and county levels.  What makes things even worse is that some local 
courts have even found themselves confronting local police and local procuratorates 
as they tried to carry out their duties.  In extreme cases, local police have even 
clashed with judges or taken away the goods confiscated by the court.  More than 50 
such cases have been reported to the Supreme People's Court since 1992.  The 
impetus behind these clashes usually comes from local establishment authorities.31 
 
Meanwhile, the lack of a detailed, unified regulation over court enforcement 
also contributes to the current difficulties.  For example, the provisions on the 
execution of verdicts in the civil procedure law seem a bit too simple to avoid a 
variety of interpretations.  Many cases also result from a poor level of awareness of 
laws and a lack of a belief in the rule of law among both the litigants and those who 
could have a say in law enforcement.32 
 
 
                                                 
30 He Sheng, “Courts face hurdles in backlog”, China Daily, November 30,1998. 
31 Id. 
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In December 1998, the Supreme People's Court issued a document concerning 
how to deal with resistance to execution of laws.  It empowers the local courts with 
greater authority and provides practical measures to defend the law's honour.  The 
Supreme Court is now launching a special training course for the senior judges 
responsible for the enforcement of judgements. 
 
To enforce civil court orders, local courts have begun to take tough actions 
against debt repudiators who refuse to pay overdue court-ordered debts despite having 
the economic ability to do so.  Initially, names of the repudiators are being published 
in the local press in an attempt to bring the problem to the public's attention.  If the 
repudiators continue to ignore the court, executors from the courts may enforce 
compliance.  Local media have given support to the campaign by publicising 
debtors' lists over the last two months.  These tough actions have proven effective in 
South China's Guangdong Province, including Guangzhou, Zhan-jiang, Shenzhen, 
Dongguan and Foshan.  For example, most of the 112 enterprises and 16 individuals 
whose names were publicised by Guangzhou Intermediate People's Court in the press 
have paid 520 million yuan (US$62.65 million) in overdue debts, accounting for 92.8 
percent of the total.33 
 
In early 1998, Beijing's courts launched a mass campaign to ensure that 
debtors cannot repudiate their obligations.  170,000 yuan (US$20,482) in 
outstanding debts was repaid within one day in Fengtai District People's Court.34 
Haidian Court announced a second order on July 17 to detain those who refused to 
carry out the court's decisions.  On May 22, Haidian Court publicised the names of 
54 units or individuals refusing to carry out court decisions involving more than ten 
million yuan (US$1.2 million).35  In addition to making the name list of debt 
repudiators public and compulsory means of enforcement such as detention, some 
local courts are restricting the daily consumption level of debt repudiators.  This has 
also proven effective. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
32 Id. 
33 Wang Rong , “Campaign launched to protect creditor's rights”, China Daily, September 11,1998. 
34 CD News, “Courts pursuing Beijing debtors”, China Daily, September 11,1998. 
35 Xinhua, China Daily, July 28,1998. 
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8. The authority of interpretation of legislation by judges 
In China, judges are only authorised to apply the legislation in the individual 
cases.  They are not qualified to make the law.  However, since some legislation is 
very general or even silent on a number of detailed issues, the judges need to exercise 
the authority of interpretation of legislation in order to determine the legal foundations 
for the case they are dealing with.  It is possible for the judges to abuse such 
authority for the sake of personal interest.  
 
Hence, it is necessary to deprive such authority on interpretation for certain 
issues.  For instance, considering the difficulty of distinguishing between the acts of 
God and normal commercial risks, the unified Contract Law has deprived the local 
court judges of the authority to make the interpretation as to whether certain 
circumstances amount to an act of God.  Only the Supreme Court has the authority to 
make a competent interpretation with regard to this issue.  
 
It is also necessary to require that court rulings describe the detailed logic and 
rationale for making the interpretation of legislation comprehensively, and to disclose 
the interpretation of legislation by judges to the public.  In practice, many court 
rulings are very simple and general with their wording, while the explanations for the 
interpretation of the legislation are sometimes not provided.  It would be beneficial 
to impose some rigid requirements on the drafting of the court rulings. 
 
 
II. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 
 
1. Overview of the ADR: Types and functions 
According to Chinese law, in the event of civil law and commercial law 
disputes, the private parties may pursue the following avenues of alternative dispute 
resolution in settling their disputes: (i) negotiation; (ii) mediation; (iii) arbitration.  
Of course, in case the negotiation or mediation fails to settle the disputes, and an 
arbitration clause is not provided in the contract and a written arbitration agreement is 
not reached afterwards, the parties may bring suit in the People's Court.  Therefore, 
the Civil and commercial dispute resolution channels in China forms a pyramid, in 
which the negotiation mechanism functions as the bottom tier, the mediation 
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mechanism functions as the second bottom tier, the arbitration mechanism functions 
as the second top tier, the litigation mechanism functions as the top tier. 
 
1) Negotiation 
In China, the civil and commercial parties tend to hold negotiation talks 
between them.  The negotiation mechanism encourages the parties to reach 
agreements on settling their disputes without the intervention of third neutral parties.  
Thus, negotiation mechanism is an indispensable part of contractual freedom.  Since 
the two parties are in the best position to know their own interest, the negotiation 
results could usually satisfy the maximum demands and interest of both parties.  
Since no third party appears in the negotiation process, the negotiation mechanism is 
the most confidential technique among all the ADR techniques.  Of course, the two 
parties may focus too much on their own interest and supporting reasons to ignore 
their opponent’s interest and supporting reasons.  However, due to the advantages of 
confidentiality, efficiency and friendship maintaining, the negotiation mechanism is 
the most predominant channel in resolving the disputes in China.  The disputes 
parties only try mediation, arbitration or litigation after they have not found success in 
negotiation process. 
 
 
2) Mediation 
In China, mediation is classified into administrative mediation and private 
mediation.  In administrative mediation process, a government agency acts as the 
mediator; in private mediation process, a private party, either a natural person, or legal 
person, including non-governmental organisation, acts as the mediator.  Although 
administrative mediation process exists for the purpose of resolving private disputes, 
it is less important than private mediation in terms of disputes resolved.   
 
In mediation process, there is a neutral third party assist and facilitate the 
dispute parties to negotiate each other, and to reach a settlement agreement.  In 
China, there are various categories of mediators, including but not confined to, 
people's mediators at grass-root level, consumer associations, government agencies, 
etc. 
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Like negotiation, mediation also permit maximum private autonomy enjoyed 
by the parties due to the following factors: First, the mediator is chosen by both 
parties.  Second, both parties are actively involved in the dispute resolution process.  
Third, the disputes are settled by agreements reached by both parties, not imposed by 
third parties. 
 
Compared to negotiation, mediation could be made much more organised and 
effective, as a third neutral party will assist the two parties to identify the best 
approach to satisfy the needs of both parties.  As a Chinese old saying indicates, the 
parties in question are usually naive, and outsiders are usually informed.  Of course, 
mediation does not work very well in every dispute, as the success of mediation 
depends upon the co-operation from both parties.  If one party refuses or fails in 
working closely with his opponent and the mediator, mediation will be frustrated.  In 
these circumstances, the parties might need to turn to arbitration or litigation.  
Among ADR techniques, the mediation mechanism is the second most popular 
channel in resolving the disputes in China. 
 
3) Arbitration 
In case the parties are unwilling to solve a dispute through consultation or 
mediation, or fail to do so, the dispute may, be submitted to a Chinese arbitration body 
or some other arbitration body.  However, the precondition for applying for 
arbitration is that there is an arbitration clause provided in the contract, or the written 
arbitration agreement reached by the parties afterwards.  The arbitration clause or 
agreement shall have the following contents: an expressed intent to request arbitration; 
items for arbitration; and the chosen arbitration commission.36 
 
According to the Arbitration Law of 1994, the arbitration award is finally 
binding on the parties, and the party that is not satisfied with the arbitration award 
may not bring the case to a people’s court.  But labour dispute arbitration is an 
exception.  For if the workers involved are not satisfied with the adjudication of 
arbitration, they may bring the case to a people’s court.  If they are not satisfied with 
the judgement of the first instance, they may appeal to the court of second instance.  
                                                 
36 Arbitration Law, Article 16 (1994). 
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Of course, it is quite burdensome for the workers to follow both arbitration and suite 
channels.  
 
2. Current situation regarding the use of ADR 
 
1) Use of negotiation 
In China, most private parties tend to consider negotiation the top priority to 
pursue in resolving their disputes.  The main reasons are that negotiation helps to 
save the time, financial and other resources for the parties, and to avoid destroying the 
long-term business or community solidarity built in the business history.  For 
instance, many business corporations in  China have established special 
departments inside the corporations, responsible for processing the consumer 
complaints.  
 
2) Use of mediation  
Chinese traditional no-litigation culture has promoted the healthy development 
and maturity of mediation mechanism as an alternative disputes resolution, which has 
been known as "East Experience" in the eye of westerners.  Therefore, both 
traditional and contemporary societies give special attention to mediation mechanism.  
For instance, people's mediators at grass-root level, new version of Chinese traditional 
mediators, are still an indispensable part of China's dispute resolution system.  As to 
May of 1999, according to the statistics of Chinese Ministry of Justice, there are 
nearly 10 million mediators in China.  They handled nearly 87,000 civil disputes in 
1998.  Over the past two decades, they have mediated nearly 130 million civil cases, 
5.3 times those handled by courts.  Their efforts have also prevented 2.86 million 
civil disputes from becoming acute, stopped more than 1.5 million attempted suicides 
provoked by civil disputes and halted 1.3 million civil quarrels from flaring up into 
criminal cases.37  Since mediation itself is a product of no-litigation culture, able to 
save the face for both dispute parties on one hand, and able to reduce the disputes 
resolution cost, it can be expected that these mediators will continue to play important 
roles in resolving the civil and commercial disputes.  Of course, mediators need 
further build their intellectual expertise, and get more actively involved in newly 
                                                 
37 Shao Zongwei, "Mediators face new challenge", China Daily, May 28, 1999.  
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emerged industries and social corners.  
 
3) Use of arbitration 
In the 1980s, foreign firms strongly objected to arbitration in China because 
they did not have confidence in the fairness of Chinese arbitration proceedings or the 
means of enforcing arbitration awards.  By the 1990s, the China International 
Economic Trade and Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) has become one of the 
largest business arbitration centres in the world, and is considered to be a fair forum. 
Since the adoption of Arbitration Law in 1994, many major cities have established 
independent arbitration bodies. Beijing Arbitration Commission is one of the newly 
emerged arbitration bodies, and arbitrates around 500 commercial cases annually. 
 
Generally speaking, the parties will voluntarily implement the arbitration 
award.  If one of the parties fails to implement the award, the other party may apply 
to a people's court for enforcement.  If the people's court that has been requested to 
enforce an arbitration award finds the award unlawful, it shall have the right to refuse 
the enforcement.  If a people's court refuses to enforce an arbitration award, the 
parties may institute proceedings concerning the contractual dispute in a court.  
 
As far as the speed of dispute resolutions is concerned, most arbitration bodies 
are able to conclude the resolution of the disputes within a fixed period.  The 
Arbitration Law of 1994 is silent on the time limit requirements for delivering the 
arbitration award.  This issue is always dealt with by the arbitration rules of 
arbitration bodies.  For instance, under Article 48 of the Arbitration Rules of Beijing 
Arbitration Commission, the arbitration award shall be made within four months 
dating from the formation of the tribune of arbitration.  Such time limit requirements 
are often satisfied.  
 
3. Parties’ viewpoints with regard to ADR 
In contrast with the characteristic of American society, Chinese traditional 
society has been reluctant to resolve the disputes through litigation.  Although 
development of market economy has stimulated the rapid growth of litigation in 
China, most Chinese people prefer ADR to litigation.  There are various reasons to 
explain such attitude.  However, Confucian no-litigation culture has played a crucial 
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role in shaping parties’viewpoints with regard to ADR. 
 
One of the fundamental characteristics of Confucian vision of law can be 
summarized as no-litigation preference.  In other words, although litigation were 
heard by the government officials who had both administrative and judicial powers, 
they were perceived as something undesirable, disgraceful and abnormal, and needed 
to be eliminated in an ideal society.  Confucius himself expressed this argument very 
clearly: "In hearing litigation, I am like any other body.  What is necessary, however, 
is to cause the people to have no litigation."38 The ironical thing was that, Confucius 
himself was once a judge.  However, he did not encourage people to go to court for 
dispute resolution.  In the same line, Fan, a learned subsequent commentator, 
interpreted no-litigation as the following, "The purpose of hearing a case is to resolve 
the dispute itself, and block the sources giving rise to disputes".  Yang also noted that, 
"Confucius did not consider hearing cases as a difficult job, rather considered 
no-litigation among and between the people as the most fundamental issue"39 
 
Then, why Confucianism was so enthusiastically pursue a utopia without 
litigation? Theoretically speaking, such a litigation-disliking attitude could be traced 
back to the root of Confucianism vale system.  In the relationship-oriented 
theoretical framework, Confucius paid special emphasis on the significance of "DE" 
(ethics, virtue and morality) building for a person who wants to become superior man 
(JUN ZI).40  Since ethical requirements are broader, stricter and more comprehensive 
than legal requirements, no qualified superior man is satisfied with only complying 
with less rigor legal requirements.  Such a characteristic thus remains the 
fundamental difference between superior man and mean man or small man (XIAO 
REN).  Once people transform themselves into superior men, the whole society will 
be in harmony and peace, and disputes in society will become less and less.  
Therefore, less or even no litigation is a necessary condition for a society to become a 
harmonious and ideal society, so called "Common wealth World"(DATONG SHIJIE).  
                                                 
38 Verse 13, Yanyuan 12, LUN YU. 
39 Zhu Xi, Adavance 11, Book 6, ZHUXI JIZHU.  
See also: http://read.cnread.net/cnread1/gdwx/z/zhuxi/lyjz/006.htm. 
40 Chinese concept"JUNZI" could be translated into various counterparts, including but not confined 
to, "gentleman", "a man of complete virtues" or "superior man". Of course, it is difficult to choose a 
most appropriate word for the translation purpose. 
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No wonder why Confucius tried his best to persuade people to get rid of litigation as 
more as possible. 
 
Confucius no-litigation attitude has greatly influenced Chinese mainstream 
legal philosophy at both official and grass-rots levels from Han Dynasty through late 
Qing Dynasty even contemporary China.  In addition to the consideration of fame or 
face, a much more important concern is about the political stability possibly brought 
by litigation.  At official level, most emperors and government officials consider 
diminishing litigation as one of their governing goals.  Thus, the number of litigation 
served as an important yardstick to evaluate the political performance of the local 
officials.  For example, Han Yanshou, a governor of Dongjun in Xi Han Dynasty, 
attributed the private litigation to his insufficient morality building.  For this reason, 
he always closed himself inside home, re-examining his faults relevant for the private 
litigation.  Consequently, the parties to the litigation also deeply blamed themselves, 
eventually, 24 counties within his jurisdiction witnessed no litigation for a period of 
time since then.41  
 
Even the court of justice of Min Guo period in early twentieth century clearly 
endorsed the no-litigation preference.  For instance, the Capital Higher Court of 
Justice in Nanjing had a horizontal hanging scroll, "Fairness and Justice"(MING JING 
GAO XUAN), its left couplet saying "the purpose of trial of litigation is to expect no 
litigation"(TING SONG QI WU SU), and its right couplet saying "the purpose of 
imposition of punishments is to reduce their imposition"(MING XING FU XU 
XING).42 
 
To guarantee the value of no-litigation preference, the governing class tended 
to obligate the dispute parties to first exhaust private mediations to settle the disputes.  
In Song Dynasty, the judges usually tried to mediate between the plaintiffs and the 
defendants, in order to diminish the litigation.  In Yuan Dynasty, it was mandated 
that, "all the disputes regarding marriage, family property, land and house, debtor's 
default, unless gross breaches of law, shall be mediated by the local community leader 
                                                 
41 Zhang Jinfan, "Several Issues on the World Position of Chinese Legal Culture and its 
modernization". See, http://www.cin.hebnet.gov.cn/Others/Rendafazhi/d6j2.html. 
42 Zhuming, "Minguo Shiqi De Shoudu Gaodeng Fayuan", Tuanjie Bao, November 27, 1999. 
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through convincing, in order to avoid the loss and waste in farming".  In Ming 
Dynasty, most minor criminal cases and civil disputes were required to submit to 
mediation first by county sheriff, local official and clan seniors.43  
 
Apart from the resistance of litigation on the part of governing class, grass 
roots people were also reluctant to bring litigation to the court.  There are several 
reasons to explain their attitude.  The first factor is the great concern about the 
litigation cost arising from motivating a case to the court.  May people got afraid of 
endless involvement into the litigation process, and inevitable suffering of loss in 
terms of money and time that would be able to be shifted to farming.  While the cost 
associated with private mediation is very moderate, the cost arising from litigation 
might be too high to under the parties' control.  The second factor is judicial 
corruption.  Judicial corruption had been a big social problem through most Chinese 
feudal history.  There is old saying, "Although the gate of court is widely open, grass 
roots people should not go there if they only have good reasons, but don't have 
enough money to bribe the judges there" (GUANFU YAMEN BAZI KAI, YOULI 
WUQIAN MO JINLAI).  Although there were many sophisticated written codes, 
most of judges were also the administrative in certain regions; it was very normal for 
the judges to follow the administrative procedures to hear the case, which was more 
arbitrary and less open.  Arbitrary and less open judicial procedure in return to breed 
judicial corruption.  The third factor is relevant to the concern about potential loss of 
face or fame.  Although litigation cost was not a big problem for the parties, they 
might be deeply concerned about their potential reputation loss arising from the 
litigation.  Chinese feudal society was a typical agricultural society.  The farmers 
had been living in certain area for succeeding generations and usually kept very close 
touch each other.  They also had to care a lot about the evaluation from other 
members in terms of family and clan harmony and personal morality.  Whatever 
roles they might play, either plaintiff or defendant, the mere fact of being aliened with 
the litigation would convey a shamed and disgraceful message to other members in 
the clan and local community.  Although there were litigation in certain periods or 
regions all the time, it was true that grass roots people generally try to avoid litigation 
                                                 
43 See also, Cheng Zongzhang, "Zhongguo Chuantong Shehui Wusong Guan Zairenshi", 
http://www.enweiculture.com/Culture/whlt/t993/zgct.htm. 
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as more as possible.  Lack of sufficient litigation incentives also partly explains why 
attorneys had not created an independent legal profession in Chinese feudal society. 
 
In English, ADR has various nicknames, such as “Adequate Dispute 
Resolution”or “Avoiding Disastrous Results.” These nicknames have strongly 
indicated the virtues and advantages of ADR.  They are also the common attitude of 
private dispute parties in contemporary China. 
 
4. Problems of the ADR 
ADR is not perfect and is not workable in all the circumstances in China.  
Rather, all ADR techniques have their disadvantages.  As far as negotiation is 
concerned, either of the two parties could block the negotiation process, and such 
blocking could happen very frequently especially when one party focuses too much 
on its own argument and ignores too much about the argument of its opponent.  For 
instance, some business corporations ignoring social responsibility or business ethics, 
do not want to take into account the reasonable consumer complaint, and therefore 
force consumers turn to mediation, arbitration or litigation.  
 
In contrast, mediator could make mediation process manageble by pointing 
out the problems frustrating the negotiation.  However, the mediator is neither an 
arbitrator nor a judge.  It means that the dispute parties have the final decision right 
as to whether to accept the mediator’s suggestion or not.  Therefore, many private 
cases could not be properly settled by mediation in China.  For instance, many 
consumer disputes of small claim are left unsettled due to the failure of cooperation 
on the part of business or consumers, lack of mediation staff and investigation means, 
lack of enforcement authority. 
 
Arbitration also has its own disadvantages.  First, it is possible that the two 
parties forget or fail in reaching an arbitration clause in advance, and that the two 
parties fail in reaching an arbitration agreement afterwards.  Second, the arbitration 
bodies are not necessarily competent enough to hear hundreds of millions of private 
disputes.  For instance, many arbitration bodies focus on hearing commercial 
disputes of large claim, but unwilling to hear hundreds of millions of consumer 
disputes of small claim.  That is why many local consumer association have begun to 
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establish special arbitration bodies responsible for hearing consumer disputes of small 
claim. 
 
5. Value in ADR 
ADR functions as a very useful, effective and workable tool in resolving 
disputes.  The values of ADR have already been demonstrated in the past Chinese 
history, not only by no-litigation culture, but also by the wide use of negotiation, 
mediation and arbitration in modern times. 
 
The first value of ADR is efficiency and cost saving.  General speaking, ADR 
requires much less resources to be devoted to settle private disputes than litigation.  
As mentioned above, based on current civil procedure legislation, it takes the parties 
nine months to get the final court rulings.  However, both courts of first instance and 
courts of second instance are entitled to prolong the trial for due cause.  In contrast, 
either negotiation, mediation or litigation could be concluded within shorter period.  
Shorter period of dispute resolution usually, if not always, means less cost, and less 
human resources spent on the dispute resolution process. 
 
The second value of ADR is maximum confidentiality or privacy.  When 
ADR techniques are used, the dispute resolution process is conducted in private, and 
not open to the public.  Nobody except the parties, their attorneys, witnesses, is 
permitted to observe the dispute resolution process without the consent of both parties.  
The parties or mediators or arbitrators have no authority to disclose the final 
settlement results, unless both parties grant the permission.  Contrarily, the litigation 
process must be open to the public, except for the cases involving national secrets, 
privacy and minors.  Even the verdicts of these three kinds of cases must also be 
announced publicly.  
 
The third value of ADR is maximum private autonomy or contractual freedom.  
In ADR process, the parties have the final and ultimate control over the procedural 
and substantive issues, including the selection of specified ADR technique, mediators 
or arbitrators, and low degree of formality than litigation.  In contrast, the litigation 
parties have less control over the litigation process than ADR process.  For instance, 
the judge is appointed by the court of justice, not by the parties.  The litigation 
 26
process is much more formal than ADR process, and is usually highly structured by 
set legal rules. 
 
Considering the value of ADR and possible negative effects of litigation, 
including costly and fame-destroyed consequences for the parties, Chinese traditional 
no-litigation culture is correct in arguing that litigation mechanism itself is not a value 
to pursue, even not the best tool to pursue the value of harmony.  In recent past years, 
China adopted the policy of building rule of law.  However, many people thought 
"rule of law" are closely connected with litigation, and consider active litigation as a 
yardstick to test the progress of rule of law.  It is very easy for the people to forget 
the most fundamental value to pursue while they are busy in suing or being sued each 
other.  Therefore, traditional no-litigation culture is positive in encouraging the 
private disputes to be resolved more effectively, gracefully and less costly than going 
to court of justice.  Such channels might be negotiation, mediation or arbitration.  
However, traditional no-litigation culture could not be interpreted as to deny the 
justification of all litigation.  Because in most cases, either plaintiffs or defendants 
are justified to protect their legitimate interests and rights through litigation, and the 
justice in individual cases would not be able to realize without litigation process.  
And Confucius himself did not said he refused to hear cases; what he said was to 
pursue an ideal society without litigation.  Of course, when litigation become 
inevitable, Confucius would urge the court to hear the cases in efficient and economic 
way, and exhaust mediation procedure first, and enforce the fair and reasonable 
judgments as soon as possible.  When modern China sets her first step in the track of 
moving to litigious society, there are always something positive could be learned from 
Confucius in promoting the growth of ADR mechanism in China. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
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